Organisation and Groups that Supports GM Crops!
The objective of this article is to examine the regulatory development and regulatory integration regimes supported by the social interests, in order to understand their criticism of the traditional trade-diplomacy approach. Broadly, this group is composed of various national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), where three types of social-interest organizations may be identified, according to the concerns they predominantly focus on – consumer, environmental and social-development organizations.
This is, however, only an illustrative categorization. In most cases, it is difficult to define social-interest groups neatly as one of the three types because, regardless of their primary mandate, many of the groups include consumer, environmental and social-development advocacy.
It will be argued that these organizations generally support regulatory development and integration approaches that are socially responsive, reflecting the social-rationality approach to regulatory development and a regulatory coordination strategy for integration.
Regulatory Development and Integration of Social-Interest Organizations for GM Crops:
Prior to discussing each of three social-interest organizations separately, it is important to develop the categorization of these groups. At the broadest level, the first distinction to draw is the difference between ‘state’ organizations and ‘non-state’ organizations.
The former are organizations whose memberships are composed of nation-states and are generally referred to as international governmental organizations (IGOs) and include trade IGOs, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), environment IGOs, such as multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), including the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), and social-development IGOs, such as the United Nations’ World Health Organization.
On the other hand, the term NGOs is often used synonymously with other terms, such as civil-society organizations (CSOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs) or independent-sector organizations (ISOs).
NGOs are composed of both commercial organizations and CSOs, which are then further categorized as consumer, environmental and social-development organizations. Both commercial organizations and CSOs can exist at the national or the international level. The categorizations are not free of controversy.
For instance, many commercial organizations would argue that they are in fact CSOs and not a separate category. Similarly, it has been noted that some public officials have suggested that they too represent civil society. Other categorizations suggest that ‘NGO’ does not include commercial or labour organizations. Further, many CSOs would reject the notion that an organization such as the USA-based National Rifle Association is a CSO.
In this study, social interests are synonymous with CSOs and there are three broad categories to consider – consumer, environmental and social-development interest groups. All three tend to share an important focus on the social-rationality approach to regulatory development and integration. In addition, they all reject two important premises of the economic perspective.
First, economic analysis generally assumes that technology and innovation are crucial elements of economic growth and social welfare. Yet social interests argue that technology is not an inherent factor in social welfare.
Instead, it is the application, management and distribution of technology that can lead to increases in social welfare or, in the case of misapplied, mismanaged and poorly distributed technology, decreases in social welfare. Secondly, the economic perspective tends to treat consumers as economic agents, where price is the only aspect of genetically modified (GM) crops that they are concerned about. For instance, if prices fall, there are consumer-welfare gains.
Social interests argue that consumers are not just economic agents but that they have legitimate concerns beyond just economic concerns, which must be included in evaluations of technology. In the UK, these concerns have led some consumers to actually spend more money on food purchases in order to avoid products made from GM crops and, presumably, to increase their welfare.
Accordingly, social interests argue that regulatory development must not simply be an exercise of correcting market failure in order to maximize technological progress. Instead, it must be responsive to social preferences and concerns, regardless of the economic rationality of those concerns.
In addition, regulatory integration must be sensitive to divergent social normative frameworks between jurisdictions and must avoid sacrificing social dimensions in the pursuit of economic efficiency and competitiveness, creating a so-called ‘hollowing-out’ of the nation-state. To avoid this, social interests support a regulatory-coordination approach to deeper integration.
There are five similarities between the three types of social-interest groups that are relevant to the development and integration of GM-crop regulations. First, they hold a particular belief system or frame of reference, which tends to be based on normative beliefs that are not subject to scientific rules of evidence and debate.
The belief systems of the three types of social interests will be discussed separately below, but it is important to note that some organizations can feel so strongly about their normative beliefs that they are willing to take illegal action, as evidenced by the destruction of UK field trials of GM rape-seed.
Further, the strength of the belief system may effectively limit the ability of social-interest organizations to participate in activities that demand compromise. For instance, it has been argued that German environmental groups in a 1991 Participatory Technology Assessment of herbicide-tolerant GM crops ‘had ambivalent feelings about being involved in a procedure in which they could not control the findings’.
In fact, van den Daele notes that these organizations withdrew from the Participatory Technology Assessment and released their version of the findings prior to the release of the final, consensus-based report. In contrast, economic interests tend to have more fluid belief systems reacting to market-demand signals, so that, when demands change, economic policies change, as evidenced by the shift to non-GM ingredients among UK supermarkets.
Secondly, for social-interest organizations, the public is the audience and these organizations tend to be very effective at conveying their position in an easily understandable manner. For instance, these interests have traditionally had little influence on the trade-policy process. Indeed, to increase their policy voice, they have found populist and sensational ways of circumventing traditional trade-diplomacy channels, as evidenced by the 1999 WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle and the 2001 Summit Negotiations of the Free Trade Area of the Americas in Quebec City.
Hence, social-interest organizations are important actors in shaping public opinion, which in turn has an important influence upon regulatory development and the prospects for regulatory integration. The public orientation of these organizations is in conflict with the traditional trade-diplomacy strategy of closed-door negotiations that are neither publicly transparent nor accessible.
It is also in contrast to the typical scientific-rationality approach used, for instance, by the international scientific community (i.e. Codex and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC)), whose work is undertaken far from the public view and at a technical level not easily understood.
Thirdly, they share the objective of promoting sustainable development. There has been a general international shift in the interpretation of ‘development’ as a goal of government policy. The traditional view of development is rooted in the economic perspective of continued growth and prosperity permitting higher income-elastic social regulations.
Development now has taken on a decisively socioeconomic character, as it is now termed ‘sustainable development’, interpreted as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. While this term does lack precision it is understood to mean a shift in policy focus from just economic to socio-economic gains.
Fourthly, the social-interest organizations share concerns, in general, about democratic-deficit and accountability issues associated with international institutions. For instance, these organizations have limited resources with which to participate in the myriad international institutions for GM-crop regulatory development (i.e. WTO, the Codex Alimentarius, the IPPC, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, etc.) and they are concerned that their perspective may not be appropriately addressed when international standards are being developed.
This concern was given credence at the 1999 G7/G8 Summit in Cologne, Germany, where the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) was allowed to participate, but the Transatlantic Consumers’ Dialogue (TACD) and the Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue (TAED) were not.
The fifth shared concern of the social-interest organizations lies with the international economic-integration approach of traditional trade diplomacy. They do not support the WTO as the dominant international institution for the integration of food-safety and environmental-protection regulations, because they believe that it fails to deal appropriately with the social-rationality approach.
In fact, a recent petition headed by the environmental group Friends of the Earth and signed by over 1200 other social-interest groups from 85 countries was presented at the 1999 G7/G8 Summit in Cologne, Germany.
The petition demanded a complete review of all the WTO’s Uruguay Round commitments prior to embarking on another round of multilateral trade negotiations. The argument was that the WTO is ‘built on an outdated model of swapping tariffs, when it should really be based on a competition-based system of regulation and liberalisation’.
Also, the dissatisfaction of civil society with ‘forced’ regulatory integration through the traditional trade approach has been incisively summed up, in respect of the Appellate Body decision in the beef-hormones dispute.
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body has, inter alia, placed the World Trade Organization in charge of determining the legitimacy of domestic health regulations; misinterpreted the provisions of the SPS text allowing countries to determine the level of appropriate risk for their citizens; favoured frequently lower international standards over higher domestic standards; dismissed the precautionary principle as a legitimate basis for health and environmental policy; and, destabilized the international trade regime by inserting itself into a dispute in which it lacks the necessary expertise and competence to adjudicate.
The general rejection of the WTO’s regulatory integration approach and its perceived failure to adequately deal with broader, social concerns, such as sustainable development, has resulted in a dramatic convergence of opposition to the WTO, where the loudest demand is for greater openness of the trade-policy system.
While openness is conceptually a win-win situation for citizens and policymakers, it is fraught with difficulties in its implementation, and many crucial debates must be resolved before a real increase in citizen engagement in the trade-policy advisory system is achieved.
Despite the similarities, however, it is inaccurate to portray consumer, environmental and social-development organizations as a homogeneous group. Instead, there are important differences among them. In fact, these differences raise doubts about the compatibility of their belief systems and the potential for a lasting, cohesive opposition to GM crops. Below is an assessment of those social-interest organizations that have played very public roles in the policy debates associated with the development and integration of GM-crop regulations.
This assessment is intended to be an illustrative survey and not a comprehensive catalogue. In addition, the discussion will primarily focus on those organizations that are international, but many national organizations have also established an effective presence in the regulatory-policy debates, so that the distinction between international and national social- interest organizations has become blurred.
Social Regulatory Integration for GM Crops:
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (BSP) represents an international multilateral environmental agreement on the trans-boundary movement of biotechnology in pursuit of deeper social integration. It is important to assess for several reasons. First, the protocol is widely supported by social-interest organizations, because it is based on the social-rationality approach to regulatory development and integration.
Secondly, the EU has stated that rules and guidelines established under the protocol will be the foundation of its regulatory integration strategy dealing with biotechnology products. Hence, it is a proxy for the EU’s trade-policy position on GM crops. Thirdly, it effectively illustrates the conflict between trade-orientated economic integration and deeper social integration.
The BSP negotiations were an international effort, under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme 1992 BD. UNEP was established in 1972 by the General Assembly as the UN’s official environmental agency. Its mandate was sustainable development – to safeguard and enhance the environment for present and future generations. UNEP is involved in both technical scientific research on the environment and in reconciling the global objectives of environmental protection with other objectives, such as trade and economic development. For instance, UNEP is involved in negotiations to establish international environmental law through ME As, such as the Montreal Protocol and the Basle Convention on the Control of Trans-Boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.
Perhaps the most ambitious initiative of UNEP is the CBD and the subsequent negotiations to create a BSP. The CBD was the culmination of a decade-long effort, begun at the Third World Congress on National Parks and Protected Areas in Bali, Indonesia, in 1982.
The objective of the CBD was to develop an international convention to commit the global community to conserving and protecting biodiversity. In June 1992, the CBD was included as Agenda’21 of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, the Earth Summit, and was signed by participating countries at the Conference.
The BSP was proposed as an initiative to regulate the trans-boundary movement of living products of modern biotechnology in order to protect biodiversity. Negotiations were concluded in January 2000, after being suspended in February 1999 because of significant obstacles. Essentially, the obstacles to the BSP are associated with the conflict between social interests, supporting environmental objectives, and economic interests, supporting trade objectives; the BSP is driven from the environmental side and yet has significant potential trade implications.
In order to protect biodiversity, the initial scope of the BSP was to develop legally binding international rules governing the testing, importation and exportation, deliberate release and commercial use of living modified organisms (LMOs). It included the advance informed agreement (AIA) principle, which meant that the Party of Import would be notified prior to a shipment of LMOs, so that it could perform a risk assessment in order to identify any potential risk(s) to regional biodiversity. The Party of Import, upon completion of the risk assessment, could allow or restrict the importation of the LMO because of identified risk(s) to biodiversity.
Although the BSP is not explicitly intended to be a trade agreement, the fact that its scope includes export and import activities makes it an implicit or de facto trade agreement associated with the international trade of GM products. A successful protocol has the potential to positively influence international trade in three significant ways – first, through increased trade transparency, according to the use of the AIA principle; secondly, through increased trade fairness, because the risk assessment procedures are intended to ensure that biodiversity risks from GM products, whether domestic or foreign, are assessed consistently, using credible procedures – that is, the use of science in performing risk assessments on products of biotechnology would be harmonized among all signatories; and thirdly, an international protocol could overcome the lack of domestic regulations in those countries with little or no experience with regulating GM products.
In this sense, the successful negotiation of the BSP can be interpreted as a potential win-win outcome. The global benefit, shared by all countries, is the overall conservation and protection of biodiversity. From an industry perspective, successful completion of the BSP has potential benefits for the further research, development, adoption and commercial use of GM products because it would potentially increase predictability and market-access opportunities.
In order to understand the current nature of the BSP, it is useful to understand the complicated negotiation procedure. The CBD Secretariat – located in Montreal, Canada – administers the BSP. Over 120 countries were involved in the seven BSP negotiations, held in – July 1996, Aarhus, Denmark; May 1997, Montreal, Canada; October 1997, Montreal, Canada; February 1998, Montreal, Canada; August 1998, Montreal, Canada; February 1999, Cartagena, Colombia; and January 2000, Montreal, Canada.
The negotiations began with the discussion of general issues, including who should be involved in the negotiating sessions. As an international governmental arrangement, the main actors would be national governments; however, the BSP negotiations also included a broad range of industry representatives and environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs). In this sense, the BSP employed a high level of openness from the beginning.
A request for draft protocol submissions by October 1996 was made. Ethiopia submitted a draft protocol on behalf of the African delegation – written by the Third World Network (TWN) – in October 1996. This draft protocol, considered as representative of the views of many developing countries, used as a framework the Basle Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.
As a result, the draft protocol treated shipments of LMOs with the same degree of prescriptive regulation as shipments of toxic or nuclear waste. Further, this draft protocol placed enormous burdens upon the Party of Export and the exporter to ensure biosafety and to gain approval before any shipment of LMOs.
In response to the draft protocol submissions, the second negotiating session involved parties staking out their positions. The third session, in October 1997, was characterized by the emerging awareness of the agricultural-commodity trade issue and the potential impact of the protocol upon the international trade of products of modern biotechnology.
Agricultural export countries reacted negatively to the Ethiopian draft protocol, highlighting the substantial differences of opinion between many developed and developing countries on what constitute LMOs and their risks. The fourth and fifth sessions primarily involved the edification of crucial definitions and issues, including the definition of LMOs, the roles of the Party of Export, the exporter, the importer and the Party of Import, the opportunity for exemptions and the scope of the AIA. Many of these issues remained unresolved.
The sixth negotiating session was to be followed by the Extraordinary Conference of the Parties to the Convention (ECOP), where the final draft BSP was to be presented for signing. However, on 24 February 1999, after it became clear that a final draft protocol was not going to be established, the decision was taken to push back the deadline for the final protocol for 18 months.
The impasse emerged when the Miami group of countries (Canada, Australia, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) rejected European efforts, supported by the other 140 negotiating countries, to extend the coverage of the Protocol in two directions – (i) to include risks to human health; and (ii) to include agri-food shipments intended for processing. The position of the Miami group was driven mostly by trade concerns.
Specifically, the ambiguous interpretations of AIA and LMOs, along with the unclear provisions on labelling and liability laws, meant that there was significant uncertainty as to what trade impact the BSP might actually have on agri-food exports from countries where GM crops had been commercialized. For instance, a study of the potential trade impact – given the ambiguity – concluded that the impact on Canadian agricultural exports could range widely – from as low as C$6 million to as high as C$1200 million. Until this severe uncertainty could be cleared up, major agricultural exporters simply could not support the protocol.
The seventh negotiating session, 24-28 January 2000 in Montreal, Canada resulted in the signing, by 140 countries, of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. In its final form, the significant ambiguities concerning the Miami group were either dealt with or at least set aside for further consideration. For instance, the definition of LMO distinguishes between LMOs intended for environmental release and GM commodities not intended for environmental release.
The former are subject to an AIA for the first-time shipment only. The protocol also specifies that there must be a clear scientific justification to ban either LMOs or AIA; however, it also allows a ‘precautionary’ ban, reflecting an environmental-type social interpretation of the precautionary principle, which can include socio-economic risks, such as impacts on local farmers. While GM commodities are not subject to an AIA, they do require mandatory labelling of GM material for the consumers’ right to know. However, both the labelling rules and the liability rules are provisional, pending further negotiations.
In respect of the prospects for enhancing regulatory integration, the BSP is intended to create an international regulatory approach to the protection of biodiversity from LMOs, within the package of other international environmental protocols included in the CBD. In fact, attempts have been made to link the BSP to other UNEP international environmental regulations, including the International Technical Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology, which are guidelines for the development of domestic regulations that deal with the safe handling and containment of GMOs within a country, and the United Nations (UN) Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, which are recommendations for the development of domestic regulations pertaining to the transport of hazardous and toxic materials.
Notable for its absence is any effort to link the potential BSP with international trade agreements. In this sense, the BSP is an environmental-protection agreement dominated by the social-rationality ethos, congruent with the broader socioeconomic concerns that the WTO framework fails to address. Proposed regulations are process or technology-based and the integration strategy is one of regulatory coordination.
Several crucial issues remain unresolved, which dampens enthusiasm for the BSP. As mentioned, and unlike the IPPC, there is no link to any international trade agreements, even though it is a de facto trade agreement, and there is no institutional mechanism for dispute settlement. Secondly, the USA is not a signatory. Although not an official negotiating party, the USA remains the world leader in biotechnology research and plays an influential role in the negotiations.
Whether the US position assumes a cautionary acceptance or an outright opposition to the BSP can have a vital influence on those signatories to the protocol which rely heavily upon market access to the USA, such as Canada. Thirdly, it appears that it will be at least 2008 before the BSP is put into effect. Negotiations on the provisional labelling rules continued until 2002, while those for the provisional liability laws continue until 2004.
Once settled, the BSP must be ratified by at least 50 signatories and then transposed into national laws. Of course, during this time, technological innovation in agricultural biotechnology will continue, perhaps making the BSP obsolete as an international regulatory development and integration agreement, even before it becomes ratified as an international treaty.
In fact, in many respects, it appears that the BSP came about more as a political compromise than as an actual attempt to establish an institutional structure for GM-crop regulations. The most contentious issues remain ‘provisional’ (unresolved) and the time-consuming ratification and implementation process could ensure its obsolescence. Its major contribution was the illusion that an international agreement blending the scientific- and social-rationality approaches and the economic and social perspectives had been achieved.